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AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF Isik Akin Aytac for the Master 
of Science in Sociology presented May 10, 1985. 
Title: The Effect of Women's Labor Force Participation on 
Marital Instability. 
APPROVED BY MEMBERS OF THE THESIS COMMITTEE: 
Charles. Bol£on 
Grant M. Farr 
This thesis examines the effect of women's labor force 
participation on marital instability. It is hypothesized 
that women's income-earning affects marriage in two ways: 1) 
the "independence effect" facilitates divorce by enabling 
women to be self-supporting; 2) the "parallel marriage ef-
feet" improves marital satisfaction and the quality of the 
marital relationship because women with higher incomes 
generally have more power in marriage. The "independence 
effect" is measured by whether or not women's income is 
sufficient, defined as income above the poverty line for the 
appropriate family size as established by the U.S. Bureau of 
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Labor Statistics. "Parallel marriage" is measured by the 
wife-husband income ratio. Both women's own income level 
and wife-husband income ratio are taken two years prior to 
her divorce. 
It is hypothesized that women with sufficient income 
will have a higher divorce rate than women with insufficient 
income. It is also hypothesized that women with incomes 
closer to their husband's incomes will have "parallel" mar-
riages and lower rate of divorce. In order to determine the 
net effects of sufficient income and income ratio on di-
vorce, other factors that may affect divorce rates are 
controlled for--family income, education, presence of pre-
school age or school-age children, and woman's age. 
This study uses data from the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Labor Market Experience (NLS) designed by the Ohio 
State University and the U.S. Bureau of the Census. NLS 
respondents were selected by a 
sample located in 235 sample areas. 
multi-stage probability 
These 235 sample areas 
included 485 counties and independent cities representing 
every state and the District of Columbia. This research 
analyzes one of the cohorts of the NLS survey--older women 
34-48--who were married in 1969 and 1971 and either remained 
married or divorced by 1972. 
The results support the hypothesis of an "indepen-
dence" effect--as women with sufficient income were three 
times more likely to divorce than women without sufficient 
incomes. The "parallel" marriage effect was not confirmed. 
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The divorce rate was higher among couples with closer in-
comes, and lower among couples with a higher income gap. 
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CHAPTER 1 
While divorce rates have fluctuated during the 20th 
century, since 1950 the divorce rate has risen continuously. 
Since women's labor force participation grew rapidly in the 
same period, it is often assumed that women's employment is 
responsible for increasing marital instability. One explan-
ation is that working women do not have enough time to ade-
quately fulfill their roles as wife and mother; husbands are 
dissatisfied, so divorce occurs. 
Traditionally, women have had all the responsibility 
for household chores and childcare. Full time homemakers 
work on average 55 hours per week, more than the average 
time spent in full-time employment. It is not surprising 
that employed women spend much less time on housework and 
childcare--26 hours per week (Vanek, 1974). This decline is 
not the result of more help from spouses. Many studies show 
that the husbands of employed women are not significantly 
more likely than husbands of homemakers to share housework 
and childcare (Moore, Sawhill, 1978). It does seem that 
when women start working outside the house, they have less 
time for housework and childcare. 
A different hypothesis is that when women work they 
gain economic independence, making it easier for them to end 
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an unsatisfactory marriage. As housewives, married women 
have been economically dependent on their husbands. This 
condition has changed as women gained more opportunities for 
paid work. In 1940, only 15% of married women were working; 
by 1960, 37% and by 1980, 55% were in the labor force (U.S. 
Bureau of the Census, 1980). As a result, married women now 
have their own income. 
To better understand the relationship of divorce to 
women's increased labor force participation, we need to 
understand why and how marriages fo~m. Men and women in 
marriage almost always have a hidden economic contract. Men 
go out to work and bring home the income, women stay home, 
take care of the children and household chores. Because it 
is unwaged, the work that women do at home is not valued 
(Benston 1969, Zaretsky 1976). However, if the services a 
wife performs had to be purchased on the market, they would 
cost a great deal. When men and women come together to 
form a marriage, they find themselves in economically-
defined, structured roles, with the women being the 
economically dependent one. Therefore, Women's Labor Force 
Participation (WLFP) does in fact mean quite a significant 
change in women's lives and marital life. 
While a focus on economic variables apparently ignores 
the complexity of the factors contributing to marital 
stability/disruption, recent theoretical work and research 
demonstrate the strong link between individuals' economic 
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position and many other aspects of marital relationships 
(Moore, Sawhill, 1978). 
A number of studies have emphasized the relationship 
of marital stability/instability to family income, husband's 
income, and wife's income. For example, although work on 
the black family assumed that cultural differences were 
primarily responsible for the higher rate of marital breakup 
among blacks compared to whites, recent research has demon-
strated the importance of economic differences. Duncan and 
Morgan (1975) found that, once family income is controlled 
for, the black divorce/separation rate is 6% lower than the 
white rate. This finding suggests that it is the economic 
characteristics of black families--for example, the stress 
caused by poverty--that leads to their higher overall level 
of marital instability. Black husband's income has a signi-
ficant impact on marital disruption (Robert Hampton 1979). 
Other 
that 
studies have demonstrated for both blacks and whites 
the higher the husband's income, the more stable the 
marriage, the lower the husband's income, the 
marital instability. (Moynihan 1967; Norton 
1976). In an income maintenance experiment 
higher the 
and Glick 
among poor 
families, Groeneveld, Tuma, and Hannan found higher rates of 
marital dissolution among the experimental families, parti-
cularly those with non-wage earning wives. They concluded 
that the wives increased access to income contributed to the 
higher divorce rate in this group. 
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Given the relationship of economic factors such as 
husband's income and family income to marital status, and 
considering that divorce rates and married women's labor 
force participation rates have both rapidly increased since 
World War II, it seems reasonable to consider the relation 
of the higher divorce rates to the rise in married women's 
labor force participation. Moore and Sawhill (1978) show 
that married women with income are more likely to get 
divorced than wives with no income. 
Yet, despite this supporting data, the divorce rate is 
only 4% higher among working women's families compared to 
non-working women's families (Amsden 1980). Why are these 
findings so contradictory? On the one hand, the data show 
an increase in labor force participation of married women 
and an increase in divorce rate. On the other hand, the 
divorce rate is. not very different among working married 
women and housewives. It is my hypothesis that WLFP does 
affect divorce as a result of women's economic independence. 
But the key point is that WLFP does not necessarily mean 
women's economic independence. 
Women earn on average 60% of what men earn (Rothman, 
1978). 34% of all working women are segregated into low-
paid clerical service jobs. In addition, 25% of all working 
women are in the professional technical occupations (Blau, 
1978). Half of the professional women are in traditionally 
female jobs, such as librarian, registered nurse, preschool 
or secondary teacher, and social worker (Grimm, 1978). 
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Moreover, because many wives shape their labor force 
participation around their family responsibilities, they 
work part-time or in lower paid jobs that allow them to more 
easily combine paid and unpaid work. On average, full-time 
working wives account for 38%, while part-time working wives 
account for 25% of family income. Therefore, the proper 
comparison here is not wage-earning versus non-wage earning 
wives but between wives whose wage work earns sufficient 
income so that they might support themselves and wives who 
do not--either because they earn too little or because they 
do not earn at all. In short, more carefully defining the 
dimension of economic independence for women (i.e., suffi-
cient income), should reveal a more clear relationship 
between WLFP and divorce. 
Besides facilitating divorce (the "independence" 
effect), women's labor force participation, in some cases, 
may actually facilitate marital stability. Women's labor 
force participation appears to equalize family power rela-
tions (Moore, Sawhill, 1978), potentially increasing women's 
level of marital satisfaction and thus tending to lower 
rather than raise the rate of divorce. 
The impact of economic factors on power relations 
within marriage has sometimes been understated in the liter-
ature. Often marital power inequalities are understood to 
be gender-determined: the husband holds greater power by 
virtue of his culturally-defined and socially-enforced role 
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as instrumental leader, legitimate authority, etc. Missing 
in this interpretation is the fact that the husband also is 
the economically powerful person. Thus, income, which seems 
to have significance primarily in the public realm, in fact, 
affects the most private spheres and intimate relationships. 
Blumstein and Schwartz (1983) found that among couples 
where the husband is the breadwinner and the wife stays at 
home, decisions are made by the husband. Wives with incomes 
have greater autonomy, and the higher their income the more 
they participate in the decision-making process. Moreover, 
because Blumstein and Schwartz compared heterosexual and gay 
couples, their research demonstrates the importance of 
income inequality in the maintenance of traditional marital 
roles. If gender ideology were primarily responsible for 
the inequalities of power in husband-wife relationships, we 
would see power more equally distributed in gay couples. 
Yet, the Blumstein and Schwartz study shows that the partner 
with the higher income also has more power in gay house-
holds. 
Among couples with relatively equal incomes, wives not 
only participate more equally in decision-making, but hus-
bands participate more equally in domestic chores. Sharing 
housework and childcare is more common among 
relatively equal incomes (Huber, Spitze 1983). 
then, that working women are more likely 
couples with 
It appears, 
to establish 
"parallel marriages," i.e., marriages in which couples share 
decision making and family responsibilities. Since such 
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marriages might be more satisfying to women, it would appear 
that women's labor force participation might also work to 
increase marital stability by increasing the marital satis-
faction of wives.1 On the other hand, it can also be argued 
that at least some men are threatened by their wife's work-
ing especially if this additional income allows or encour-
ages her to make new demands or to reject or wish to revise 
her traditional role. This, of course, would tend to 
increase the positive association of divorce with women's 
labor force participation. However, Ross, Mirowsky, and 
Huber (1983) found that the depression level among both 
husbands and wives is lowest among "parallel" marriages. 
Thus, it seems that income equality between spouses is more 
likely to increase marital satisfaction for both men and 
women than to increase husbands' dissatisfaction. 
It is hypothesized that the higher the husband-wife 
income ratio, the more equally distributed power and 
decision-making are, and thus the lower the divorce rate. 
And, the lower the husband-wife income ratio, that is, the 
more gap between their incomes, the less equal the relation-
ship and the higher the divorce rate. 
1 There are many different reasons for divorce. This 
study investigates how the economic factors in women's lives 
might relate to divorce, regardless of who initiates the 
divorce. 
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The "independence• effect and "parallel" marriage may 
act in the same or in counterposed directions in relation to 
marital instability. For example when wife-husband income 
ratios are high, i.e., closer, there is a more parallel-type 
marriage1 therefore we might expect lower divorce rates. 
But, on the other hand, it might be that those women who 
have more parallel marriages have higher incomes, and so 
they also have the economic independence which will tend to 
increase the likelihood of divorce. Similarly, some studies 
find that there is greater marital stability where the ratio 
of the wife's wage relative to her husband's is low. This 
would seem to indicate that parallel marriages are not more 
satisfying to the partners than marriages with larger in-
equalities. However, it may be that in marriages where the 
wife's income is low compared to her husband's income wives 
generally do not earn income sufficient to be self-support-
ing. In that case, it may be that the negative effect of 
unequal power relations on the wife's marital satisfaction 
is counter-balanced by her economic dependence. On the 
other hand, in the more infrequent instances where women 
have sufficient incomes but are married to men with signifi-
cantly more income-earning power, both affects--marital 
power relations and women's economic independence are 
operating in the same direction--toward divorce. The fol-
lowing two by two table illustrates the line of argument. 
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•p.ARALLEL• MARRIAGE 
(Wife-Husband Income Ratio) 
Sufficient Income 
High Gap 
1 2 
Sufficient Income 
Low Gap 
IHDEPENDERCE 
EFFECT 
(Wife's Income) 
3 
Insufficient Income 
High Gap 
4 
Insufficient Income 
Low Gap 
Cell 1: Woman's income is sufficient to live by herself. 
Her income is less than her husband's, which means 
less power in the relationship. She is likely to be 
dissatisfied, and she can afford to divorce. 
Cell 2: More equal relationship, therefore, less likelihood 
of divorce. But the woman has sufficient income, so 
she can get divorced. 
Cell 3: A less equal relationship, so a woman would want to 
get divorced. But her income is not sufficient, so 
she cannot get divorced. 
Cell 4: Woman's income is equal to or higher than her 
band's which means the possibility of an equal 
tionship is greater, therefore, she would not 
to get divorced. In addition, her income is 
sufficient. 
hus-
re la-
want 
not 
In cells 1 and 4, independence effect and income ratio 
are working in the same direction. So we might expect to 
find the highest divorce rates in cell 1, and the lowest 
divorce rates in cell 4. In cells 2 and 3 , since the two 
effects operate in different directions, we would expect 
divorce rates to fall between the highest and lowest rates. 
With cell 2 and 3 the two forces are acting separately with-
in the cell. In cell 2, the power relation is a negative 
force for divorce, the partners have a more equal relation-
ship, 
force 
while 
for 
the woman's income sufficiency is a 
divorce. In cell 3, the partners have 
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positive 
a less 
equal marriage because the woman's income is less than her 
husband's, so there is a positive force for divorce1 but 
the woman's income is not sufficient for her to be indepen-
dent from him, so there is a negative force for divorce. 
CHAPTER II 
METHODOLOGY 
The data for the analysis of marital instability in 
relation to economic independence and parallel marriage is 
taken from the National Longitudinal Survey of Labor Market 
Experience (NLS) designed by the Ohio State University and 
the U.S. Bureau of the Census. The NLS survey included bi-
ennial interviews with 5000 women, 30-44 years old beginning 
in 1968. These women form the basis of the present study. 
NLS data is well suited for this research due to its longi-
tudinal character1 and detailed information on labor force 
participation, which allowed examination of marital instabi-
lity in relation to economic resources for individual women 
throughout the years. 
Sampling Procedure 
Sampling procedure consisted of a multi-stage probabi-
lity sample located in 235 sample areas. Initially, all the 
nation's counties and independent cities were grouped into 
1900 primary sampling units (PSU). To represent the 
1NLS data are only available up until 1975 at Portland 
State. Therefore this research will cover the period from 
1968 to 1975. 
civilian, non-institutional population from these 
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1900 
PSU's, two hundred thirty-five sample areas were selected 
consisting of one or more relatively homogeneous PSU's 
according to socioeconomic characteristics. These 235 
sample areas included 485 counties and independent cities 
representing every state and the District of Columbia. 
In order to provide better statistical analysis for 
comparisons of blacks and whites, a three to four times 
higher sampling ratio for blacks was used. Each cohort 
initially had a 5000 sample, with approximately 3500 white 
and 1500 black females. 
Completion rates at the end of the ten year survey 
were very good. In 1977, 78% of older women and in 1978, 
76% of young women were interviewed. 
Variables 
The dependent variable, marital status, was obtained 
each survey year, with categories of: 
1. Married spouse present. 
2. Married spouse absent. 
3. Widowed. 
4. Divorced. 
5. Separated. 
6. Never married. 
In this research, categories one and two were combined 
as the "married" group, and four and five were combined as 
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the "divorced" group. By grouping into two categories, 
marital status variable is treated as a dichotomous variable 
with divorce, one, and married, zero. 
Independence Effect is an independent variable 
measured by the woman's full-year income two years prior to 
her divorce. "Sufficient" income will be defined as income 
above the poverty level for the appropriate family size 
(1,2,3,4,5) established by the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
statistics (see Table I). 
Parallel Marriage Effect is also an independent 
variable which will be measured by the wife-husband income 
ratio, (in five levels: 0-20%, 21-40%, 41-60%, 61-80%, 81% 
or higher) two years prior to her divorce. 
Family Income is used as a control variable, as di-
vorce varies among different family income levels. Previous 
studies reveal that divorce is higher for lower family in-
come levels, and lower in higher family income levels. 
Age of Children is used as a control variable since 
age of children may effect the decision for divorce. Women 
with pre-school age children might find it hard to provide 
daycare or babysitting and, thus, postpone the decision for 
divorce. On the other hand, birth of a child may also 
precipitate divorce by disrupting the wife/husband relation-
ship. 
Women with school age children might find it easier 
to divorce, as they no longer have to find and pay for 
daycare or babysitting. 
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TABLE I 
POVERTY LEVELS FOR NON-FARM FAMILIES, 1970* 
Poverty 
Size Level 
1 person $2010 
2 persons $2604 
3 persons $3099 
4 persons $3968 
5 persons $4680 
•taken from Statistical Abstract of U.S.A. 1984, p. 447. 
Education is used as a control variable, as divorce 
rate may vary for different education levels. 
Age of woman is used as a control variable, as 
previous studies show that divorce is higher at earlier ages 
and relatively less in older groups. 
During the course of the NLS survey from 1968 to 1975, 
two to three percent of the married women in the older women 
cohort were divorced or separated between each of the survey 
year* (see Table II). These women, and their counterparts 
*The NI..S did not survey each cohort with the same questions each 
year. The older tNOITen group \Ere asked their marital status in 1968, 
1969, 1971, 1972, 1974. Both divorced and separated women are in-
cluded in the "divorced" category. 
Married 
Divorced 
TABLE II 
PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL 
STATUS BY YEAR 
MARITAL STATUS 
1969 1971 1972 
86.4% 85.2% 85.0% 
(3690) (3482) (3403) 
2.4 2.7 1.8 
a year before (96) ( 110) (73) 
Remarried 1.2 1.3 0.8 
( 50) ( 5 2) ( 34) 
Divorced 10.2 10.8 12.3 
(436) (441) (494) 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
Total N 4272 4085 4004 
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1974 
84.0% 
(3220) 
2.4 
(93) 
1.7 
( 6 6) 
11.9 
( 458) 
100% 
3837 
who remained married, comprised the sample for this study. 
In order to test the hypotheses, it was necessary to obtain 
information on respondent's income, husband's income and 
family income for both those married women who divorced and 
those married women who stayed married between each of the 
survey years. Unfortunately, income questions and marital 
status questions were not asked consistently over the years. 
Complete information on income and marital status was avail-
able for only a small part of our potential sample: those 
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women who were married in 1971 and either remained married 
or were divorced by 1972. 
In order to eliminate as much as possible factors 
other than the economic variables which are the focus of 
this study, only women who had been married for several 
years, from 1969-1971, were included. 2 Of these women, 1.5% 
were divorced by 1972. 
Information on women's own income, their husband's· 
income, and family income, was obtained for 1970. This 
seemed appropriate since it is likely that there is usually 
some time lag between the initiation and implementation of 
the decision to divorce or separate. 
2oivorce rate in first few years may reflect basic incompatibi-
lity rather than the economic factors. 
CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
There is a significant difference between the mean 
income of the women who divorced and the women who remained 
married, $4,031 and $3,092 respectively, indicating that 
married women with higher incomes have higher divorce rates. 
Husband's income is lower for the divorced group than for 
the married group ($5,909 and $7,966 respectively), consis-
tent with previous findings of a higher divorce rate, the 
lower the husband's income. Similar results were found for 
the mean family income--the divorced group having a signif i-
cantly lower mean family income ($9,912) compared to the 
married group ($10,457). (See Table III) 
There is a positive and significant relationship be-
tween divorce and women's sufficient income ("independence" 
effect) 
effect) 
and husband-wife income ratio ("parallel" 
(Table IV). However, these independent 
marriage 
variables 
are also highly correlated with other factors known to af-
fect divorce--family income, education, age, presence of 
pre-school or school age children. Multiple classification 
analysis (MCA) has been used to control for these variables 
and 
the 
to identify only the net impacts of wife's 
husband-wife income ratio on divorce. 
income 
Since 
and 
MCA 
TABLE III 
MEAN INCOME IN 1970 OF SELF, HUSBAND 
AND FAMILY, WOMEN MARRIED IN 1971 
BY MARITAL STATUS, 1972 
Married 1972 
Divorced 1972 
Own Husband's 
Income Income 
1970 1970 
$3,092*** 7,966** 
(3243) (3077) 
$4,031*** 5,909** 
( 6 4) ( 6 2) 
*significance, p = .10 
**significance, p = .01 
***significance, p = .001 
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Family 
Income 
1970 
10,457* 
(2339) 
9,192* 
( 4 8) 
D
IV
 
W
IN
C 
D
IV
**
 
1.
00
0 
.
05
7 
1.
00
0 
.
00
6*
 
W
IN
C 
1.
00
0 
1.
00
0 
SU
FF
IN
C 
RA
TI
O
 
FA
M
IN
C 
ED
UC
 
PS
A
 
SA
 
AG
E 
N
 -
19
23
 
*
S
ig
n
if
ic
an
ce
 
le
v
el
 
TA
BL
E 
IV
 
PE
AR
SO
N 
CO
RR
EL
AT
IO
N 
C
O
EF
FI
C
IE
N
TS
 
SU
FF
IN
C 
RA
TI
O
 
FA
M
 IN
C 
ED
UC
 
PS
A 
.
04
0 
.
08
1 
-
.
0
2
7
 
-
.
0
3
8
 
.
02
7 
.
04
0 
.
oo
o 
.
11
6 
.
04
7 
.
11
8 
.
84
2 
.
82
1 
.
21
0 
.
19
5 
-
.
2
1
3
 
.
oo
o 
.
oo
o 
.
oo
o 
.
00
0 
.
oo
o 
1.
00
0 
.
72
5 
.
20
6 
.
16
4 
-
.
2
2
3
 
1.
00
0 
.
oo
o 
.
oo
o 
.
oo
o 
.
00
0 
1.
00
0 
.
03
9 
.
07
4 
-
.
1
4
4
 
1.
00
0 
.
04
2 
.
00
1 
.
00
0 
1.
00
0 
.
40
1 
-
.
1
3
3
 
1.
00
0 
.
oo
o 
.
oo
o 
1.
00
0 
-
.
0
2
5
 
1.
00
0 
.
13
4 
1.
00
0 
1.
00
0 
*
*
D
IV
 =
 
D
iv
or
ce
: 
SU
FF
IN
C
 
=
 
S
u
ff
ic
ie
n
t 
In
co
m
e:
 
RA
TI
O
 
=
 
In
co
m
e 
R
at
io
: 
SA
 
AG
E 
.
03
0 
-
.
0
2
8
 
.
09
5 
.
10
7 
-
.
1
6
9
 
.
06
0 
.
oo
o 
.
00
4 
-
.
2
8
4
 
.
12
0 
.
oo
o 
.
oo
o 
-
.
1
2
3
 
.
04
1 
.
00
0 
.
03
7 
-
.
1
2
1
 
.
05
5 
.
oo
o 
.
00
8 
-
.
0
6
4
 
-
.
1
5
6
 
.
00
2 
.
oo
o 
.
20
2 
-
.
 
28
9 
.
oo
o 
.
oo
o 
1.
00
0 
-
.
2
6
8
 
1.
00
0 
.
00
0 
1
.0
0
0
 
1
.0
0
0
 
W
IN
C 
=
W
om
en
's
 
In
co
m
e:
 
FA
M
IN
C 
=
 
F
am
il
y 
In
co
m
e:
 
ED
UC
 
=
 
E
du
ca
ti
on
: 
AG
E 
=
W
om
en
's
 A
ge
1 
PS
A
 
=
 
P
re
se
n
t 
P
re
-s
ch
o
o
l 
A
ge
 C
hi
ld
re
n1
 
SA
 
-
P
re
se
n
t 
S
ch
oo
l-
ag
e 
C
h
il
d
re
n
. 
.
.
.
.
.
 
\D
 
provided more information about the distribution 
divorce rate within the different levels of 
independent variables, it seemed preferable to 
regression analysis for purposes of this study. 
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of the 
the two 
multiple 
Women with "sufficient" incomes had a higher divorce 
rate, (3%) than women with "insufficient" income (1%). On 
the basis of an F test this difference is significant at p = 
.02 level. In addition, as women with insufficient income 
approach sufficiency, i.e., as their income rises, their 
rate of divorce increases markedly. Divorce rates in the 
"insufficient" group are low at all income levels up to 
$3, 000 where divorce jumps to 4% a.nd then to 19% in the 
highest income group. (column III, Table V). On the other 
hand, among women with sufficient income, the divorce rate 
between income groups shows no particular pattern. Taken 
together, these results indicate that income-earning affects 
a woman's decision to divorce insofar as that income allows 
her to support herself and her children if she has any. 
Once this capacity for self support is achieved, income is 
much less determinative of the decision to divorce. 
This result demonstrates the importance of distin-
guishing between various categories of working wives in 
assessing the impact of women's labor force participation on 
marital stability. Income-earning in itself does not in-
crease the propensity for divorce. The overall higher di-
vorce rate among women with sufficient income, the higher 
divorce rate around the sufficiency cut-off income level, 
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and the lack of difference in rates once that level is 
passed, are highly supportive of the hypothesized •indepen-
dence effect". 
A second hypothesis of this research was that the 
greater the income equality between husband and wife, the 
lower the divorce rate. On the basis of previous studies, 
it was assumed that couples with relatively equal incomes 
would have more "parallel" and thus more satisfying 
marriages and therefore lower divorce rates. The results do 
not support this hypothesis. 
The effect of a relatively equal husband-wife income 
ratio among married women with both "insufficient" and 
"sufficient" incomes is to raise the rate of divorce. 
Within both groups, women who earned significantly less than 
their husbands (high gap) were much less likely to divorce 
than were women whose incomes were closer to their husbands' 
income (low gap). Thus, among married women with sufficient 
incomes, 2% of wives who earned between none and 80% of 
their husbands' income were divorced compared to 6% of wives 
who earned 81% or more of what their husbands earned. Simi-
lar results were found for the women with "insufficient" 
incomes: the divorce rate was 1% for high gap marriages, 4% 
for marriages where incomes were relatively equal. This 
result apparently contradicts previous research which indi-
cates that husband-wife income equality tends to produce 
more "parallel" marriages and that both husbands and wives 
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are happier in parallel marriages. (Huber, Spitze 1983). 
One possible explanation of these differing results 
may be that marriages in which women have incomes close to 
their husband's income are both more unstable and more sat-
isfying. They are more likely to end in marital break-up--
but those that do not break up will be "parallel" marriages, 
more satisfying than other marriages. In marriages where 
women make almost equal economic contributions to family 
support, wives may be less willing to accept the traditional 
roles which are generally legitimated by the husband's 
"breadwinner" status. In this situation, wives may feel 
they have more rights to equality than in a marriage where 
husband's income provides the primary economic support. 
However, husbands may be unwilling to adapt to the change 
wives demand. In this case, closer husband-wife income 
ratios would not lead to sharing and thus parallel mar-
riages, but to marital dissolution. This would be true even 
in those cases where women did not earn "sufficient" 
incomes--for while the wife might be willing to live with 
the ensuing conflict, the decision to divorce is not hers 
alone 1 • From the same reasoning, marriages in which women 
1Another interpretation of the high divorce rate in 
this group is that the group is composed almost entirely of 
poor families. Families where women have low incomes which 
all equal to or greater than their husbands are almost cer-
tain to be poor. This does seem to be the case. Mean fami-
ly income in this group is $5,885 while the family incomes 
for the other groups ranged from $8,777-$11,612. 
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earn •sufficient incomes• as well as incomes close to their 
husband's income, would be the most divorce prone as well as 
potentially the most parallel. 
Actual •parallel• marriages appear to be the least 
common form of marriage. Generally, husbands resist sharing 
domestic work and childcare even when their wives work. 
Therefore, where women can be self-supporting and where 
their claim to change in traditional roles appears legiti-
mate, women may be the most demanding, and therefore their 
husbands may be the most dissatisfied, so both husband and 
wife may be likely to leave the marriage. The highest 
divorce rate (6%) is indeed found among such women in the 
"sufficient• group who earn at least 80% of what their 
husbands earn. Unfortunately, since the NLS survey provides 
no information on who initiated divorce, this line of 
explanation could not be pursued in this study. 
I 
TA8[B v 
MULTIPLE CLASSIFICATIOO ANALYSIS WITH DIVORCE THE DEPENDENI' VARIABLE; 
~·s IN:n£, IN:n£ RATIO, THE INDEPENDENI' VARIABLES; AND FAMIOC, 
EDUC, PSA, SA, 1\GE THE a:lNl'R)L VARIABLES. 
PERCEN.r DIVORCED 1972 AKHi ~MARRIED 
1969-1971, WITH SUFFICIENT OR INSUFFICIENI' INCXlHE, 1970. 
II 
N Divorce Divorce Rate 
Rate Adjusted for 
ALL~ Independent 
Variables 
~ WITH INSUFFICIENT 
IN:n£, 1970 1437 .01 
ONrl Income 
1970 
0 876 .01 .01 
1 - 1000 241 .01 .01 
1001 - 2000 171 .oo .oo 
2001 - 3000 111 .01 .00 
3001 - 4000 49 .06 .04 
4001 - sooo 9 .22 .19 
BETA .16 .13 
Husband-Wife 
Income Ratio 
1970 
0 - 80 1406 .01 .01 
81 - HI 31 .06 .OS 
BETA .12 .08 
~ WITH SUFFICIENI' 
INCXlHE, 1970 486 .03 
ONrl Income 
1970 
2001 - 3000 34 .03 .04 
3001 - 4000 93 .OS .06 
4001 - sooo 113 .02 .03 
SOOl - 6000 93 .01 .02 
6001 - 7000 S7 .02 .02 
7001 - 8000 47 .07 .06 
8001 - 9000 21 .OS .04 
9001 - HI 28 .oo .oo 
BETA .11 .12 
Husband-Wife 
Income Ratio 
1970 
0 - 80 334 .02 .02 
81 - HI 152 .06 .06 
BETA .13 .14 
III 
Divorced Rate 
Adjusted for 
Independent 
Variables + 
Corvariates 
.01 
.01 
.oo 
.01 
.04 
.19 
.13 
.01 
.04 
.06 
.04 
.06 
.02 
.02 
.02 
.06 
.06 
.oo 
.11 
.02 
.06 
.14 
I 
CHAPTER 4 
COHCLOSIORS 
This analysis of the impact of women's labor force 
participation on marital dissolution supported the hypo-
thesis that wives who are capable of self-support are more 
likely to divorce: women with sufficient incomes were three 
times more likely to divorce than women with insufficient 
incomes. Examination of the divorce rate for each income 
level among women with the two groups (women with sufficient 
and 
the 
women with insufficient incomes) 
importance of women's economic 
further demonstrated 
self-sufficiency in 
determining divorce. 
income approached 
The divorce rate increased as women's 
sufficiency, but once that point was 
passed 
results 
the impact of income on divorce 
support the contention that 
diminished. 
women's labor 
These 
force 
participation affects marital stability primarily insofar as 
wives are able to achieve economic independence. 
It was hypothesized that divorce would be lower among 
couples with more equal incomes, because these marriages are 
more likely to be egalitarian and, therefore, more satis-
fying to women. This hypothesis was disconfirmed. The data 
showed a positive rather than a negative association between 
relatively equal husband-wife income ratios and divorce. 
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This result appears to contradict previous research demon-
strating greater satisfaction among husbands and wives in 
•parallel• marriages. A possible explanation for this re-
sult has been advanced. While closer husband-wife incomes 
may result in "parallel• marriages for those couples who 
remain married, similar incomes may also result in higher 
conflict and higher divorce rates, as wives make more de-
mands which husbands are unwilling to meet. In this case, 
husbands rather than wives may initiate the divorce--espe-
cially in those instances where women are not economically 
self-sufficient. Since the survey did not include informa-
tion necessary to test this explanation, further exploration 
has to be deferred. 
In addition to revealing an interesting direction for 
research on the impact of women's labor force participation 
on marital stability, this study indicates that increasing 
economic opportunity for women has contributed to the rising 
divorce rate. As more wives become permanently employed in 
better paying jobs, divorce can be expected to remain high. 
Analysis of the younger women cohort in the NLS survey--
those women who were 14-24 when the survey began in 1968--
and comparison with the older women studied in this research 
should be an interesting area for further exploring the 
relationship between women's labor force participation, 
women's economic independence, and divorce. 
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